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2Addressing multiple bit/symbol errors in DRAM
subsystem
Ravikiran Yeleswarapu and Arun K. Somani
Abstract—As DRAM technology continues to evolve towards smaller feature sizes and increased densities, faults in DRAM subsystem
are becoming more severe. Current servers mostly use CHIPKILL based schemes to tolerate up-to one/two symbol errors per DRAM
beat. Multi-symbol errors arising due to faults in multiple data buses and chips may not be detected by these schemes. In this paper,
we introduce Single Symbol Correction Multiple Symbol Detection (SSCMSD) - a novel error handling scheme to correct single-symbol
errors and detect multi-symbol errors. Our scheme makes use of a hash in combination with Error Correcting Code (ECC) to avoid
silent data corruptions (SDCs). SSCMSD can also enhance the capability of detecting errors in address bits.
We employ 32-bit CRC along with Reed-Solomon code (ECC) to implement SSCMSD for a x4 based DDRx system. Our simulations
show that the proposed scheme effectively prevents SDCs in the presence of multiple symbol errors. We are able to achieve this
improvement in reliability with similar READ latency as compared to existing ECC. For this design, we need 19 chips per rank (storage
overhead of 18.75 percent), 76 data bus-lines and additional hash-logic at the memory controller.
Index Terms—DRAM Reliability, Reed Solomon Code, Hash, Chipkill, silent data corruption, Error correcting Code, multiple bit errors
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1 INTRODUCTION
FAILURES in DRAM subsystem are one of the majorsources of crashes due to hardware errors in comput-
ing systems [2]. As DRAM technology continues to evolve
towards smaller feature sizes and increased densities, faults
in DRAM devices are predicted to be more severe. Small cell
dimensions limit the charge that can be stored in them. This
results in lower noise margins. As cell density increases,
coupling (or crosstalk) effects come into picture. In-fact,
researchers have recently identified "disturbance error" [19]
in newer DRAM devices. This error has a cross-device cor-
relation, hence will lead to multi-bit errors across different
devices in a rank.
Each generation of DDRx family has doubled the trans-
fer rates and reduced I/O voltages, and therefore, transmis-
sion errors in the Memory controller-DIMM interface are
on the rise [1, 26]. Most of the servers use CHIPKILL [4]
based reliability schemes. They, can tolerate only one or two
symbol errors per beat. Multiple bit errors spread across the
chip boundaries of a rank may not be detected by these
schemes. Errors in bus along with growing device failures
increase the frequency of multi-bit errors in the data fetched
from DRAM subsystems.
Numerous field studies such as [1,3] studied large scale
data-centers and predict that future exascale systems may
require stronger reliability schemes than CHIPKILL. These
studies base their analysis using limited protection mecha-
nisms/logging capabilities and therefore the actual failure
rates might be greater than their assessments.
We first describe our error model, which captures the
effect of various type of faults that may occur in DRAM
devices and the data-bus. This model complements recent
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efforts such as AIECC [13], which focus on faults in address,
command and control signals. We then propose a new error
handling mechanism - Single Symbol Correction Multiple
Symbol Detection (SSCMSD). As single symbol errors/beat
are more frequent [3], our mechanism uses ECC to correct
them. In addition we use a hash function to detect the
less frequently occurring multi-bit (or symbol) errors. A
hash function will detect multi-symbol errors with a high
probability. It is the judicious combination of the two, i.e
ECC and hash that makes our scheme effective.
We believe that SSCMSD is a very effective reliability
mechanism for HPC/data-centers. More frequently occur-
ring single symbol errors are corrected to achieve low re-
covery time. On the other hand, relatively infrequent, multi-
symbol errors are detected by SSCMSD. Our scheme is also
suitable for Selective Error Protection (SEP [31]), as we can
enable/disable the enhanced detection capability provided
by the hash for certain applications.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2
introduces DDRx subsystem, Section 3 describes prior work
in the field of memory reliability. In Section 4, we perform
preliminary experiments to understand the impact of multi-
symbol errors to Single Symbol Correcting Reed Solomon
(SSC-RS) code and to validate our simulation framework.
Our error model is described in Section 5. Section 6 details
our SSCMSD scheme. In Section 7, we evaluate our scheme
with other mechanisms. In Section 8, we summarize our
work with Conclusion.
2 DDRX MEMORY ORGANIZATION
A DDRx [6,30] based memory is organized into hierarchical
groups to enable designers to trade bandwidth, power, cost
and latency while designing memory subsystems. At the
topmost level, the subsystem comprises one or more chan-
nels. Each channel is made up of one or more DDRx DIMMs,
3Fig. 1. Memory channel - Memory controller is connected to DRAM
modules (DIMMs) through shared bus.
a shared Data-bus, Address/Command bus, Control and
Clock signals. Each DIMM includes multiple DRAM chips
which are grouped into multiple "ranks". Typically, each
DIMM has one, two, four or eight ranks. Furthermore,
each chip has multiple independent banks. Each bank is
composed of multiple sub-arrays [21] and a global sense
amplifier. Each sub-array is further organized into a ma-
trix of rows and columns with a sense amplifier. Figure
1 shows the organization of a channel which is composed
of two x4 (transfer width - 4 bits) based DIMMs. The data
bus is organized into sixteen groups or "lanes", each lane
is shared by DRAM devices (or chips) across a channel.
Address/command and control buses drive all the devices
in the channel.
The memory controller (MC) handles memory requests
from processor/cache/IO devices. As shown in Figure 1,
the MC communicates address, commands, and data to
the DRAM ranks over the channels. Typically, read/write
cache miss require 64-byte data to be transferred between
MC and DRAM memory subsystem. In this paper, we refer
this 64-byte data (plus additional redundancy if any) as
a cache-line. This is communicated in eight "beats" (8-half
bus cycles). For a DRAM subsystem composed of DDR4,
x4 devices, each beat activates an entire rank [33] (sixteen
devices) and MC fetches/sends 64 bits of data per beat.
3 PRIOR WORK
This section summarizes schemes currently used by the in-
dustry and recent academic efforts to improve the reliability
of DRAM subsystem. SECDED [7] and CHIPKILL [4] mech-
anisms were developed to address DRAM device errors.
JEDEC introduced four schemes in DDR4 [14] to partially
address signal integrity errors. MEMGUARD [23], Bamboo-
ECC [12] and AIECC[13] are recent academic efforts which
are closely related to our work.
3.1 SECDED
During 1990s, memory modules in servers were protected
by using SECDED Codes. These codes make use of redun-
dant (or check) bits to correct single-bit or detect double bit
errors in a beat. For a typical beat size of 64 bits, SECDED
code [7] makes use of eight redundant bits. SECDED de-
sign can correct 1-bit error or detect 2-bit errors in 64 bits
(per beat) with 12.5% redundancy and 8 additional bus
lines/channel. In practice, it can detect/mis-correct some
multi-bit errors [12] as well.
3.2 CHIPKILL Correct
As the demand for larger, high-density memory modules
increased in the server industry, there was a need to protect
against a single device failure. IBM introduced the "CHIP-
KILL Correct" error model to tolerate the failure of a single
DRAM device in a rank.
CHIPKILL implementations make use of Reed Solomon
(RS) Codes. RS codes use Galois "symbol" (set of bits) based
arithmetic [8] and like SECDED use additional logic to
generate codewords (set of data and check symbols) using
data symbols. The circuit complexity of RS code increases
with the symbol size. Therefore, small symbol sized RS
codes such as 4-bit and 8-bit ones are more commonly used.
There are two popular versions of chipkill:
1) SSCDSD (Single Symbol Correct, Double Symbol
Detect) CHIPKILL: AMD’s 2007 design [10] and Sun
UltraSPARC [11] provide SSCDSD capability for x4 DRAM
devices by using 4-bit symbol RS code with four check
symbols. To maintain redundancy at 12.5%, this design
uses 32 data symbols (128 bits), 4 check symbols (16 bits)
per beat with 144-bit data bus and 36 devices per rank.
The nature of the design is such that it "over fetches", i.e.
two cache lines are accessed during a memory transaction
(8 beats * 32 data devices/rank * 4 bits = 128 Bytes) and
uses 144 bit data bus. Therefore, it may result in increased
energy consumption.
2) SSC (Single Symbol Correction) CHIPKILL: To
reduce cache access granularity, in 2013, AMD developed a
SSC based 8-bit symbol RS code [5] for x4 DRAM devices.
This scheme uses the 72 bit data bus and 18 devices per rank
(64 data + 8 redundant bits/beat). In this design, bits from
two successive beats are interleaved to form one codeword
with "Chipkill" functionality [5, 40]. For 8 beats from x4
devices, each cache request makes use of four codewords.
Each codeword comprises 16 data and two check symbols
with a redundancy of 12.5%. This design is used as our
baseline for comparison.
When there are >1 symbol errors/codeword (mostly
due to multiple chip failures), AMD uses history based
hardware-software approach to cover these scenarios [5].
3.3 DDR4 Bus reliability mechanisms
1) WRITECRC: WRITECRC is designed to detect
transmission errors in data during WRITE operation.
In this design, the memory controller generates an 8-bit
CRC checksum for the entire write data burst (8 beats)
to each chip/data-lane [14] of the rank. These 8 bits are
sent over two additional beats after the data is sent to the
individual chips. Each DRAM chip also has logic to re-
compute the CRC checksum and compare it with checksum
sent by the controller. Such a design allows the chips to
4detect errors before storing them and provides an option to
retry the transmission of the data. However, transmission
errors during READs (not covered by WRITECRC) may
also lead to SDCs with the baseline scheme.
2) CA (Command/Address) parity: CA parity uses an
additional pin (or bus-line) to transfer even parity of the
CMD/ADD signals to every DRAM chip. It cannot detect
an even number of bit-errors on the CMD/ADD signals.
3) Data Bus Inversion (DBI): DBI is designed to protect
against Simultaneously Switching Noise (SSO) [20] during
data transmission. This scheme is only available for x8, x16
DDR4 chips. With 8 Data bits/pins and an additional 9th
pin per each data-lane, DBI ensures that at least 5 out of
9 pins are "1"s. This avoids the situation where all bits go
from 0 to 1 or from 1 to 0 to improve the signal integrity of
data bus.
4) Gear Down Mode: Gear-down mode allows the
MC to lower transmission rate of command/Address
and control signals to trade-off latency and command
bandwidth for signal quality while maintaining high data
rates/bandwidth.
3.4 Memguard [23]
Memguard is a reliability scheme designed to detect multi-
bit errors in DRAMs without using redundant storage. It
makes use of two registers (READHASH, WRITEHASH)
and custom logic at the memory controller (MC). Whenever
there is a memory transaction between the last level cache
and the DRAM, the logic at MC computes a hash value for
this transaction and READHASH/WRITEHASH registers
are updated. This scheme does not store the hash values
in the memory as they use incremental multi-set hashing
technique [35]. By periodically synchronizing the two hash
registers at the MC, this scheme detects errors in data.
Memguard relies on OS-checkpointing for error recovery.
Although this scheme can detect multi-bit (or multi-
symbol) errors, on its own it is not suitable for
HPC/datacenters due to the high recovery time associ-
ated with checkpointing and synchronization. Also, Mem-
guard is effective only against soft errors. Although our
design is motivated by Memguard’s scheme, we do not
use incremental multi-set hashing technique which is at the
core of Memguard’s design and instead store hash along
with data and ECC bits in the DRAM (use redundancy).
Thus, unlike Memguard, we employ ECC and hash to
provide correction/detection capability for each cacheline
and do not require any synchronization for error detec-
tion. This ensures faster recovery, effectiveness against both
permanent and soft errors, and is therefore suitable for
HPC/datacenters/servers.
3.5 QPC Bamboo ECC [12]
QPC Bamboo-ECC is an 8-bit symbol RS based scheme
designed to target more frequently occurring error patterns.
They provide CHIPKILL capability with 12.5 % redundancy
for x4 based memory systems and show that they perform
better than AMD’s RS-SSC CHIPKILL in reducing SDCs
for certain type of faults. Since they use one codeword for
the entire cache-line, their design leads to increased READ
latency.
Our goal in this paper is to consider more realistic error
model based on the nature of faults and develop an appro-
priate scheme to protect against them. We demonstrate that
Bamboo-ECC and extended Bamboo-ECC (same overhead
as ours) are prone to Silent Data Corruptions when faults
are spread across multiple chips/buses.
3.6 AIECC-All Inclusive ECC [13]
AIECC is a suite of mechanisms designed to protect against
CCCA (clock, control, command, address) faults without
additional redundant storage or new signals to and from
memory.
Our work is orthogonal to AIECC. We focus on im-
proving reliability against device, bus errors while AIECC
focuses on CCCA errors. The reliability of future memory
systems can be improved by incorporating our scheme
along with AIECC.
4 PRELIMINARY EXPERIMENTS
In the presence of an error, a generic reliability scheme re-
ports it as either a Correctable Error (CE) or a Detectable but
Uncorrectable Error (DUE). When an error is outside of the
coverage of the scheme, it can result in Detectable but Miss-
corrected Error (DME) or Undetectable Error (UE). DMEs
and UEs are collectively called as Silent Data Corruptions
(SDCs) as the scheme inadvertently forwards corrupt data
without raising an alarm.
The baseline scheme uses RS (18, 16, 8) systematic SSC
code. A RS (n, k, m) codeword has k data symbols and n-
k check symbols with m bits per symbol. The minimum
hamming distance between any two codewords is n-k+1 (3
in this case). It can correct b(n−k)/2c (1 for baseline scheme)
symbol errors. When there is an error across multiple sym-
bols of a codeword, this RS decoder can either identify it to
be uncorrectable error (DUE) or "miss-correct" it to another
codeword thinking it to be a single symbol error of another
codeword (DME) or fail to detect presence of the error (UE).
This can result in Silent Data corruptions in the baseline
scheme. We therefore devised simple set of experiments to
assess the amount of Silent Data corruptions in the baseline
in presence of multi-symbol errors.
We developed an in-house simulator to perform our
experiments. We used open source software [16], [36], [41]
to develop galios (symbol-based) arithmetic, RS encoder,
decoder. We use generator polynomial -G(x) = (x−a1)(x−
a2)...(x − aN ) (where N - number of ECC symbols/CW)
to construct RS code. Our decoder uses Berlekamp Massey
algorithm for correcting/detecting errors. Due to the sim-
plicity of hardware design, most of the hardware implemen-
tations use either algorithm based on Euclidean approach
or Berlekamp Massey to implement Reed Solomon decoder.
We also verified that the simulation results are similar with
Euclidean based RS decoder.
For each iteration of the experiment, we fed random
16 byte dataword to RS encoder and stored the 18-symbol
codeword in an array. With the help of 18-symbol error
5Experiments Miscorrected Detected but Undetected
Uncorrected
2 Symbol 6.3% 93.7% 0% (0)
Errors/CW
3 Symbol 6.9% 93.1% -> 0%
Errors/CW (1˜0,000)
4 Symbol 7.0% 93% -> 0%
Errors/CW (1˜0,000)
TABLE 1
Experiments/Results of Random multi-symbol data errors for RS
(18,16,8).
mask, we inserted errors into the stored codeword. We
then, decoded the stored codeword (with errors) using the
RS-decoder. The decoder flagged whether each codeword
had "No Errors" or "Detectable but Uncorrectable Errors" or
"Correctable Errors". If the decoder detected a correctable
error in a codeword, it corrected the corresponding stored-
codeword. Next, we retrieved the stored data word pro-
cessed by RS-decoder and compared it with the original data
word to identify silent data corruptions.
We executed three experiments - introducing random 2,
3 and 4 symbol errors per codeword. Each of this experiment
was run for ten iterations and each iteration handled 1
billion random datawords. Table 2 lists the mean % across
10 iterations for the number of miscorrections, detected but
uncorrectable errors and undetected errors. The standard
deviation for each of the experiments (except for undetected
errors with random 2 symbol errors) was up to 13,000. We
also show the mean of undetected errors along with mean
% to show give a glimpse of actual number of undetected
errors we encountered.
4.1 Analytical Analysis
We can explain these results of our experiments with the
help of analytical methods. Figure 2 depicts the codespace
of the baseline RS (18, 16, 8) code. In the figure, stars
represent valid codewords and diamonds represent non-
codewords. Due to errors, a particular codeword (say CW1)
gets corrupted and may be detected by RS decoder as a
non-codeword (diamond) or as other codeword in the space
[12]. The dotted hypersphere which is HD = 1 away from
codeword represents the correction range of the SSC. All
the words on this sphere will be corrected to the codeword
on the center of the sphere (in this case CW1). Words on
HD=2 hypersphere (solid line in green) are either detected
as errors or miscorrected to the adjacent codeword. Words
on the dashed sphere (HD=3) are either correctly detected as
errors or undetected (falsely detected as adjacent codeword)
or miscorrected as another codeword.
For a generic RS (n, k, m) code, the total n-tuple space
available is 2n∗m. Out of this space, the number of code-
words are 2k∗m. Assuming that the space is uniformly
distributed among the codewords, we can say that the space
around (or owned by) each codeword is 2n∗m/2k∗m.
If we introduce "e" symbol errors from a given codeword
(say CW1), all such words lie on a hypersphere at HD=e
from the codeword. If "e" is greater than minimum HD of "n-
k+1", this sphere may also contain other codewords. For ex-
Fig. 2. N tuple space representation of Reed Solomon SSC code. Stars
are codewords which are atleast 3 Hamming Distance apart.
Fig. 3. CW A, CW B are two 18-symbol codewords which are HD = e
apart. Notice that dataword "CW A + e-symbol error" is HD = 1 (differ in
1 symbol) from CW B.
ample, as shown in Figure 2, the RS code has two codewords
(CW1 and CW2) which are HD=3 apart. If we introduce 4
symbol errors from CW1, the hypersphere centered on CW1
with radius 4 also contains CW2. On an average, the number
of such codewords Ce on or inside a hypersphere HD=e
away is approximately given by dividing the total number
of words inside the sphere by number of words "owned" by
each codeword :
Ce =
∑e
α=1 nCα(2m−1)α
(2m)
n−k − 1 (1)
The RS decoder "mis-corrects" such an "e" (where e >
(n− k + 1)) symbol error from a given codeword when the
e-symbol error also : 1) falls on HD = 1 sphere of another
CW which is HD = e away OR 2) falls on HD = 1 sphere of
another CW which is HD = e-1 away OR 3) falls on HD = 1
sphere of another CW which is HD = e+1 away. For example,
Figure 2 shows a hypersphere at HD = 4 away from CW1.
This sphere represents all the 4-symbol errors from CW1.
Few words on this sphere get mis-corrected to CW3, which
is at HD = 4 away from CW1. Due to presence of CW2 at
HD = 3 away from CW1, few other words on sphere HD=4
also fall on HD=1 sphere of CW2 and therefore get mis-
corrected. Similarly, few other words on this HD = 4 sphere
also fall on HD = 1 sphere of CW4 which is at HD = 5 away
from CW1.
6Using eq (1), the number of CWs at HD = e from a given
codeword is given by Ce − Ce−1 which is equal to
nCe(2m−1)e
(2m)
n−k (2)
Now, due to the presence of one CW at HD = e from
a given CW (say CW A), more than one "e" symbol errors
are mis-corrected. Figure 3 shows two codewords CW A
and CW B which are HD=e away. There will be exactly
eCe−1·(2m−2) number of "e" symbol errors from CW A which
are HD=1 away from CW B and hence will be miscorrected
to CW B. Combining this with eq (2) we get the expres-
sion for total number of "e" symbol errors from a given
codeword CWA that will be miscorrected due to presence
of codewords at HD=e from CW A:
me =
nCe · (2m − 1)e · eCe−1 · (2m − 2)
(2m)
n−k (3)
Similarly we can calculate number of "e" symbol errors that
will be miscorrected due to presence of codewords at HD =
e-1, HD = e+1 given by (4) and (5) respectively :
me−1 =
nCe−1 · (2m − 1)e−1 · (n− e+ 1)C1 · (2m − 2)
(2m)
n−k
(4)
me+1 =
nCe+1 · (2m − 1)e+1 · (e+ 1)Ce
(2m)
n−k (5)
The total number of "e" symbol errors from a CW is given
by nCe·(2m−1)e. Therefore, the fraction of miscorrections in
the total set of "e" symbol errors from a CW is given by :
mtotal =
1
nCe·(2m−1)e
· (me +me−1 +me+1) (6)
Using (6), we calculate the fraction of mis-corrections
for the experiments. For the first experiment (Random 2
Symbol errors) as RS (18, 16, 8) code has a minimum HD
of 3, there are no codewords at HD = 2 or HD = 1,
therefore me and me−1 do not contribute to the expres-
sion in eq (6). We calculate the fraction of miscorrections
for this experiment to be 6.3 %. This value corroborates
with the experimental results shown in Table 1. The total
information space available for single symbol correcting RS
(18,16,8) is 218∗8(2n∗m). Out of this, 216∗8(2k∗m) are to be
used as codewords. As the fraction of codewords over the
total space is only 2−16(216∗8/218∗8), as the code-space is
sparsely populated 93.7 % of random errors on HD=2 sphere
do not fall on HD=1 spheres of other codewords. Also, as
expected we do not observe any undetected errors in this
experiment as there are no codewords at HD = 2. Similarly,
we calculate the fraction of mis-corrections for the second
and third experiments and find that these also corroborate
with the experimental results in Table 1.
As we are able to corroborate the experiment results
with our analytical model, we have confidence that our
experimental framework is able to accurately simulate Reed
Solomon decoder and random error injection. Also, these
results further motivated us to develop a solution to tackle
SDCs in current/future DRAM subsystems.
Fault mode Source Error pattern
per cacheline
1 bit fault Particle strikes OR 1 bit error/
Cell failure in a cacheline
sub-array
1 pin fault Fault in 1DQ of 1 pin stuck at 0
a bus lane OR or 1 for all beats
sub-array failure
Row/Chip/ Failure of sub-array 1 word related
Bank fault row drivers/address to faulty chip
decoding circuit in all beats
is stuck
at 1 or 0
Column Failure of single 1 bit stuck at 0/1
fault column in in a cacheline
a sub array
Bus fault Fault in 1 bus lane errors in random
beat positions
of a bus
Correlated External noise or Bus faults in
Bus fault coupling between consecutive
two consecutive bus-lanes
bus-lanes
1bit/pin + Combine 1 bit/pin faults which
other faults fault with pin/ lead to
row/chip/bus 2 symbol errors
fault
Chip + Chip Failure of 2 different 2 specific words
fault chips in all beats stuck
at 0 or 1
3 fault combine 3 of the Random errors
mode above mentioned in 3 words
faults in all beats
TABLE 2
Error Model
5 ERROR MODEL
To represent the possible fault modes that may occur in
current/future DRAM systems, we first describe our error
model. This model covers various type of faults that arise in
DRAM devices and the data-bus.
Faults in DRAM subsystems are caused due to a variety
of sources such as cosmic rays [29], circuit failure, signal
integrity etc.. These faults can be broadly categorized as
transient or permanent. Transient phenomena corrupt mem-
ory locations temporarily, once rewritten these locations
are free from errors. Permanent faults cause the memory
locations to consistently return erroneous values.
Field studies [1,3] help us in understanding the trends
of errors in DRAM subsystem up to a certain extent. We
use this information along with nature of faults in DRAM
subsystem to develop our error model (Table 2). Here, we
describe the sources of these faults and the corresponding
errors perceived per cache-line due to a particular fault
type. Single bit faults are mainly due to failures in DRAM
7Transmission Fault Description / Cause Impact on Signal Integrity
Dielectric Loss Signals attenuate as a function of trace length and frequency All data bits are affected, results
in signal attenuation
Skin effect Resistance of conductor varies non-uniformly with frequency All data bits are affected, results
in signal attenuation
Electromagnetic Electromagnetic/capacitive coupling of closely packed lines few bus lines/lanes are affected
interference at one point of time
Skew Path length variations result in timing variations Random
Jitter Fluctuations in voltage, temperature and crosstalk between Difficult to model/characterize
successive cycles of a given signal impact the propa-
gation time of the signal
Inter symbol Past signals on a line have residual effects on subsequent No. of bit lines affected: Random,
interference signals of the same line Data dependent
Simultaneously When many signals in a bus-lane switch, they induce coupling Data dependent.
switching output on other signals
TABLE 3
Summary of Data Transmission faults
cells. Due to failure in a sub-array or one DQ pin (one
bus line in a bus-lane), bits transferred over a single DQ
pin are corrupted. Failures in circuitry inside chips such
as sense amplifiers, address decoders etc. cause particular
rows/columns/banks/chips to malfunction. For example,
if a local row buffer (sense-amplifier) in a bank of a chip is
stuck at 1, then all the bits fetched from the chip of particular
READ request are read as "1". Therefore each word (bits
provided by a chip in one beat) fetched from this chip will
have all 1’s for this particular READ.
Bus faults are another source of errors. According to 1st
order analysis, bus lines act as a low pass filter. Since digi-
tal signals are composed of numerous frequencies, distinct
components of this signals experience attenuation to a dif-
ferent degree giving rise to signal degradation. Reflection is
another first order effect which results in signal degradation.
Table 3 describes other sources of transmission faults [26]
and their impact on signal integrity of the data bus. As most
of the errors associated with bus faults are data-dependent
or random, we expect random errors in different beats of a
faulty bus. To simulate this behavior for a single bus fault,
we use a random number to identify the erroneous beat
positions among eight beats. We then inject random errors
in these positions. We also consider correlated bus fault due
to presence of external noise or coupling between two bus
lanes. In this fault-mode, we expect two consecutive bus
lanes to faulty. Similar to single bus fault, we first identify
erroneous beat positions and inject random errors for these
two consecutive bus lanes.
We combine single bit faults (as they occur with
higher frequency [28]) with other fault types to model 2-
symbol/chip errors per codeword. With increase in the
possibilities of fault occurrence especially in exascale sys-
tems, there is a higher possibility for other faults to occur
simultaneously across three different chips/bus lanes. To
cover such scenarios, we include 3-fault mode (fault which
leads to random errors in three random chips/bus-lanes).
6 SSCMSD - A NOVEL ARCHITECTURAL SOLU-
TION FOR MULTI-BIT/MULTIPLE SYMBOL ERRORS
We first carried out a set of experiments detailed in our
error model to study the behavior of the baseline (SSC-
RS (18,16,8)) scheme. The results are shown in the 2nd
column of Table 5 in the Evaluation section. As described
earlier, as the code-space is sparsely populated this scheme
can detect many multi-symbol errors as well. However, as
shown by the experiment results, the baseline is still prone
to SDCs with multiple device and bus faults. Inspired by
this observation, we chose to further decrease this SDC rate
by improving the ECC scheme at the memory controller
with minimal increase in redundancy (1 more redundant
chip and 1 more bus lane).
With one more chip and bus lane at our disposal, one can
simply extend the baseline scheme. This extended baseline
scheme uses three check symbols (instead of two used in
baseline) per each codeword to provide SSC capability. The
fourth column of Table 5 shows the performance of this
scheme with our error model. This scheme has lower SDC
rate when compared to baseline, but it is still prone to SDCs
with multiple symbol errors.
An interesting point to note from these results is that
the SDC rate is dependent on the type of error pattern a
fault generates rather than on the number of bits/symbols
being corrupted. For example, 1 bit + Chip fault corrupts
9 bits per CW and has 6% SDC rate while 1-bit fault +
1-pin fault corrupts 3 bits of a particular CW and has a
SDC rate of 7.6% for the baseline scheme. Although we
do not show the breakdown of SDCs into UEs and DMEs
for the baseline in Table 5, our evaluation shows that for all
the experiments of baseline and Extended-baseline schemes,
SDCs occur mostly (99%) due to miss-corrections (DMEs)
from the SSC-RS decoder. Therefore, the stored information
is subjected to errors from faults and due to errors induced
by the decoder. These observations inspired us to use a
hash function, as the hash value allows us to identify such
arbitrary corruption in the data. Taking a cue from the
design of Memguard [23], we use a non-cryptographic hash
function to compute a signature of the data. We use this
signature to detect multi-bit errors with high probability. By
8combining hash and CHIPKILL, we develop our new error
handling scheme, called Single Symbol Correct, Multiple
Symbol Detect (SSCMSD) CHIPKILL.
As shown in Figure 4, during WRITE operation, we can
combine the hash and baseline CHIPKILL scheme in three
possible ways :
Scheme A: Compute the hash of data and then use SSC
encoder to encode data and hash.
Scheme B: Encode the data and then compute the hash of
encoded data.
Scheme C: Encode the data and compute the hash of data
in parallel.
As shown in Table 5 the baseline and extended base-
line provide CHIPKILL(SSC) correction capability, but with
multiple symbol errors, they result up-to 8% SDC rate. The
purpose of using the hash is to further reduce this SDC
rate without impacting the existing reliability provided by
SSC code. Therefore, while retrieving the data from the
DRAM (READ operation), we use a simple, straight forward
design to build upon the existing SCC capabilities. First,
we perform the SSC decoding, in this process the decoder
will tag each retrieved codeword to have NO Error OR
Correctable Error OR Un-correctable Error. We then use the
hash to validate the findings of the decoder.
On analyzing Scheme B and Scheme C with this simple
retrieval mechanism we find that there is a possibility of a
false positive i.e report data which was correctly handled by
SSC decoder to be erroneous. This happens when the hash
gets corrupted (erroneous). In this scenario, when there is
a single symbol error or no error in the data/ECC symbols
of a codeword, the decoder corrects it or reports that the
retrieved data is free from errors, respectively. But, as the
hash is corrupted in this scenario, the second step of the
retrieval process reports that the data is erroneous. With
Scheme A there is no scope for such false positives as hash is
also correctable by SSC decoder. At the minimum, Scheme
A guarantees to provide the reliability already offered by
baseline (SSC decoder). In addition, it also provides capabil-
ity to detect miscorrections OR undetected errors missed by
the SSC decoder. Hence we identify Scheme A to be most
suitable for our purpose.
As described earlier, Scheme A generates the hash of
the data before encoding it with the RS-SSC encoder. This
encoded data, hash pair (codeword) is stored in the memory
during WRITE. When this stored codeword is retrieved
from the memory during READ, we first employ the RS-
SSC decoder to correct/detect errors. The RS-SSC decoder
corrects up to one symbol error in each codeword to retrieve
data, hash pair. As noted earlier, there is a possibility of
silent data corruption in the retrieved data, hash pair if there
are multiple symbol errors in the codeword. To detect this
scenario, we recompute the hash of data retrieved from the
SSC-RS decoder and compare it with the retrieved hash.
If the hashes match, then with a high probability, we can
conclude that there are no SDCs in the retrieved data.
When the two hash values do not match, this indicates the
presence of multiple symbol errors. Thus, we can effectively
avoid silent data corruptions.
When there is up to one symbol error per codeword,
this combined scheme (Scheme A, SCC decoding + Hash
validation) corrects the codeword (similar to the baseline
Fig. 4. Possible hash and SSC combinations
scheme) and pass on the requested 64-byte cache-line to
the processor. Hence, applications waiting for this cache-
line can resume their execution almost immediately on the
processor. But if there is a multi-symbol error in any of
the codeword, our scheme would detect that with high
probability and prevent silent data corruption. This is an
improvement over the baseline scheme.
6.1 WRITE Operation
As shown in Figure 5, during a WRITE operation, we
use a hash function to generate 32 bit output (4 symbols)
from the entire cacheline (64 Bytes). Similar to the baseline
SSC-RS scheme, the 64 Byte data is divided into 4 blocks
(Block0-Block3), each block is composed of 16 symbols. We
distribute the 4 symbol hash output across the 4 data blocks
by combining each data block of size 16 data symbols with
1 hash symbol to obtain a dataword. The size of our "ex-
tended" dataword is 17 symbols, as opposed to 16-symbol
dataword used in the baseline design. Each dataword is
encoded using RS (19, 17, 8) code to obtain a 19-symbol
codeword. This 19-symbol codeword is interleaved across 2
beats as in the baseline design. Therefore, we need a total
of three additional chips (storage overhead of 18.75%) per
rank and 12 redundant bus-lines in every channel.
6.2 Read Operation
Similar to the baseline scheme, during a READ request (or
MISS) two consecutive incoming data beats at the memory
controller are combined to obtain a 19-symbol codeword.
As shown in Figure 6, for DDRx systems, the codewords
of this READ request are obtained in four consecutive bus
cycles. We need to employ SSC decoder on each codeword
to obtain the 64-byte data and then validate this data with
the help of hash function. As this two-step approach intro-
duces additional latency to the READ MISS, in the following
paragraphs, we describe our novel design to minimize this
latency.
The SSC-Reed Solomon decoding on the received code-
words is typically done in two phases. In the first phase,
syndrome is computed to identify if there are any errors.
Error correction (second phase) is computationally more
expensive and therefore is triggered only when syndrome
9Fig. 5. SSCMSD Design. 32 bit hash is split into 4 symbols (red). Each
hash symbol is combined with 16 symbol data block (blue) to form a
dataword.
computation block detects errors. Since errors are relatively
rare, the average delay incurred due to decoding will be
close to the error free case where only the syndrome compu-
tation is performed. Study [34] mentions that delay of SSC-
RS syndrome calculation is about 0.48 ns with 45nm VLSI
design library. For DDR4 [4] with a memory clock frequency
of 1200 Mhz, syndrome computation can be implemented
within one memory cycle.
The detection capability of our scheme depends on
hash function properties such as length, collision resis-
tance, avalanche behavior, distribution etc. [24]. Also, a non-
cryptographic hash is suitable for our design as crypto-
graphic hash functions are more complex in terms of com-
putation time, which increases the memory latency. Studies
[24,32] show that non-cryptographic hashes - CityHash,
MurmurHash, Lookup3 and SpookyHash have good prop-
erties with respect to avalanche behavior, collision resistance
and even distribution. CRC-Hash is also widely used due to
its simple hardware design and due to its linear property.
We analyzed the hardware design of Lookup3, Spookyhash
[25, 40], CRC-Hash [37] and found that these can be im-
plemented using combination logic. Therefore these hash
functions can be easily implemented within four memory
cycles.
Since we are using systematic SSC-Reed Solomon code,
RS syndrome calculation and hash computation can be done
in parallel. As shown in Figure 6, DDRx provides two beats
of data per memory clock cycle, hence SSC-RS syndrome
calculation (shown in the figure as RS) and hash compu-
tation can start at the second cycle. Both these operations
can be completed in five memory cycles. Each codeword
received at the memory controller for decoding has 16
data symbols, one hash symbol and two ECC symbols. We
denote the 64 data symbols and four hash symbols obtained
from all the codewords which are not yet decoded by RS
decoder as D’ and H’ respectively. We first compute the hash
(H1) of the 64 data symbols (D’) and compare it with H’.
The retrieved hash H’ can match the computed hash H1
when :
Case A1: There is no error in H’, D’ OR
Case A2: D’ != D (the original 64-byte data
stored/written in the memory) due to some error and H’
= H (the original hash stored/written in the memory) but
due to hash aliasing, H’ = H1 OR
Case A3: H’ != H due to some error and D’ != D due to error,
but H1 (function of D’) = H’.
The retrieved hash H’ does not match H1 when there is
error in hash OR 64-byte data OR in both hash and 64-byte
data.
In parallel, the RS decoder calculates the syndrome Si for
each codeword CWi. Si can be equal to 0 when:
Case B1: There is no error in CWi OR
Case B2: There is an undetected error in CWi.
Similarly, the syndrome is non zero when there is an
error in the codeword.
Based on comparison of H1 and H’ and four values of
Si for i=1 to 4, we come up with a decision table (Table 4).
In the scenario where both the hashes match and syndrome
is zero for all the four codewords (Scenario 1), we declare
the cache-line to be free from errors. Theoretically, there is
scope for silent data corruption here as it could be because
of case A2 or A3 and case B2 for all the four codewords.
From our preliminary experiments in Section 5, we can
see that the probability of undetected errors is very less
(0.001 %) for each codeword. The probability reduces further
when considering this scenario over all the four codewords.
Therefore, we declare this scenario to be free from errors.
For Scenarios 2,4 where at-least one of the syndromes Si is
not zero, we can check if we can correct with the help of
SSC-RS and verify again with the hash. In the scenario 3,
where the hashes do not match and all Si are 0s, we declare
the cache-line to have an undetectable error due to error in
data OR in both data and hash.
As the error free scenario is more common when com-
pared to erroneous scenarios, we design our READ op-
eration in a way that minimises latency in the error free
scenario. Therefore, as shown in Figure 6, we check for
Scenario 1 at the end of five cycles and declare the cache-line
to be free of errors if Scenario 1 is found to be true. Other-
wise, there are two possibilities, either at-least one of Si !=0
(Scenarios 2,4) OR Scenario 3. For Scenario 3, we declare the
cacheline to be a uncorrectable error. In case of Scenarios 2
and 4 we use RS-SSC correction logic on codewords whose
Si !=0 to determine if each such codeword has a "correctable
error" (CE) or "detectable-uncorrectable error" (DUE). If any
one of them is an uncorrectable codeword, we declare the
entire cache-line to be uncorrectable. Otherwise we correct
all such codewords to obtain the corrected 64-byte data (D")
and 32-bit hash (H"). In this case, there is a scope for Silent
Data Corruptions (SDCs), therefore, we compute the hash
H2 from D" and compare H2, H". If these hashes match, then
with a high probability there is no silent data corruption. If
the hashes do not match, then we can conclude that SDC
occurred.
Thus, we are able to reduce SDCs with our novel ap-
proach. On an average, the additional latency introduced
per each READ miss our is expected to be one memory clock
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Fig. 6. SSCMSD Design. During Read operation, syndrome computation and hash calculation are done in parallel. If any of the syndromes are
non-zero AND if there are no uncorrectable errors, SSC correction is employed and Hash is computed to detect Silent Data Corruptions.
Hash Syndrome Decision
check calculation
1 H1 = H’ Si = 0 Declare Error Free
for i = 1 to 4
2 H1 = H’ atleast one of Error, Try to correct
Si != 0 it with SSC-RS and
check back with hash
3 H1 != H’ Si = 0 Declare Error
for i = 1 to 4
4 H1 != H’ atleast one Error, Try to correct
of Si != 0 it with SSC-RS and
check back with hash
TABLE 4
Possible scenarios after initial step of Hash computation and Syndrome
calculation.
cycle. Note, that this is the similar to latency in the baseline
(SSC-RS) scheme.
There is scope for false negatives (report no error al-
though SSC decoder fails in presence of multiple symbol
errors) due to hash collisions. The probability of false nega-
tive is estimated by using the upper bound on SDC rate for
the baseline SSC-decoder (8%) and collision probability for
a N-bit hash is estimated by birthday paradox (2−N/2). The
upper bound on false negatives for our scheme is given by:
Upper bound on P (false negative) = 0.08 ∗ 2−16 (7)
6.3 Address Protection
Errors in address bus during memory WRITEs will lead
to memory data corruption [13]. To prevent this scenario,
JEDEC has introduced CAP-Command Address Parity [14]
in DDR4. Another recent work, AIECC [13] proposed a
stronger protection mechanism called eWRITECRC to ad-
dress this concern.
With weaker CAP, errors in address bus during memory
READs will result in reading codewords from an incorrect
address. As the baseline CHIPKILL scheme does not keep
track of address associated with the data, it will decode the
codewords and inadvertently pass the data from incorrect
address location to entity (I/O or processor) which initiated
this READ request. Therefore, this will result in Silent Data
Corruption. To provide stronger protection for up-to 32
address bits, eDECC was introduced in [13].
The 32-bit hash we used in SSCMSD design can also
be used to detect multi-bit errors in the address bus during
READs. We can hash all the address bits (8 bytes) along with
the data during WRITE operation shown in Figure 5. This
hash (H), which is stored in the form of 4 symbols in the
DDRx memory will protect against both data and address
(during READs) corruption. During the READ operation,
as the memory controller generates the address, it already
has the correct address. So, the hashes H1, H2 described
in Section 6.2 will now be a function of both Data (D’/D")
and the correct address. When a transmission fault results
in corruption of address bits during a particular READ re-
quest (address A) [13], the memory controller in our design
receives the hash and corresponding data stored in address
A’ (the corrupted address). At location A’, we have the data
and the hash of data, address (A’) stored, so the RS-decoder
will not be able to detect errors, but the hashes H’/H" will
not be equal to H1/H2 and hence Silent data corruption is
prevented.
6.4 Hash Selection
As described earlier, we consider non-cryptographic hash
functions - Spookyhash, Lookup3 (hashlittle [38]), CRC-
32 to be employed in SSCMSD. Jenkins [15] recommends
"short" version of SpookyHash for key size less than 192
bytes. We use this "short" SpookyHash for our evaluations
as our key size with data, address is 72 bytes.
Minimum hamming distance (HD) and parity are im-
portant parameters useful for deciding the generating poly-
nomial for CRC-32. For keysize of 72 bytes, CRC-32 poly-
nomials such as Castagnoli (1,31), koopman32k (1,3,28),
koopman32k2 (1,1,30) provide minimum HD of 6 [39].
Therefore, errors up-to 5 (6-1) random bit flips are guar-
anteed to be detected by these polynomials. Errors which
result in 6 or more bit-flips are not guaranteed to be de-
tected by these polynomials. Also, the above mentioned
HD=6 polynomials have even parity, hence they guarantee
detection of all odd bit errors. IEEE 802.3 (32) polynomial
provides a minimum HD of 5 for our keysize and has odd
parity.
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Fig. 7. Simulation methodology.
We used SpookyHash, Lookup3, CRC-32-Castagnoli (as
a representative of HD=6, even parity polynomials), CRC-
32-IEEE 802.3 (as a representative of odd parity polyno-
mial) hash functions in our simulations shown in Table for
SSCMSD design. Across all the fault modes, we did not
find any difference in performance of these hash functions.
Hence, we can employ one of HD=6 CRC-32 polynomials
(Castagnoli / koopman32k / koopman32k2) for our SS-
CMSD design as they are simple, provide minimum HD=6
codewords with even parity and enable us to compute the
hash in parts (due to linear property) during the READ
operation.
7 EVALUATION
We evaluate our scheme and compare it with the existing
schemes and their extensions with the same overhead as
our scheme. Baseline (RS-SSC(18,16,8)) and Bamboo-ECC
(Bamboo-ECC (8 ECC symbols)) use 18 chips per rank and
provide CHIPKILL capability. SSCMSD uses 19 chips per
rank (Storage overhead - 18.75%). Therefore, we extend both
the baseline and Bamboo ECC with additional redundancy
using their methodology of incorporating redundancy to
create equal overhead conditions. RS-SSC (19,16,8) uses 3
ECC symbols, the correction capability of this code is still
one symbol (b(n − k)/2c). The 12-ECC symbol version of
Bamboo-ECC is capable of correcting up-to 6 error-symbols.
The goal of our experiments is to compare the number
of Silent Data corruptions across all the schemes for our
error model. We classify fault modes to be causing up to
one OR two OR three symbols/CW to be erroneous for
the baseline, extended baseline and SSCMSD schemes (See
Section 4). As Bamboo and extended Bamboo use vertically
aligned codeword, our error model effectively translates to
cause 2 to 12 symbols to be erroneous. For the rest of the
discussion, we use the terminology of error model relative
to the baseline scheme.
The following mechanisms are used to introduce errors
in the encoded cacheline stored in DRAM subsystem:
1) Single bit fault : Flip a random bit in the cacheline.
2) Single pin fault : As two beats are interleaved in the
baseline scheme to form one codeword, each 8-bit symbol
is composed of four 2-bit pairs. As each chip has 4 data
pins, each 2-bit pair of this symbol is transferred via one
pin. We therefore choose a DQ pin randomly and flip two
corresponding consecutive bits of a symbol.
3) Single memory chip fault/failure : Choose a chip
randomly and replace the data in the chip with a random
pattern OR with all 0s OR all 1s.
4) Single bus fault: Choose a bus lane randomly and
use an 8-bit random number to identify the erroneous beat
positions among eight beats. As each bus-lane transfers
eight beats, we then inject random errors in these positions.
But, we ensure that atleast one word of this faulty bus lane
is corrupted.
1-bit, 1-pin, Row/Chip/Bank, Column, Bus faults cause
errors within 1 Chip or Bus lane. Correlated bus fault affects
two consecutive bus lanes. As discussed in the error model,
we evaluate the following 2-chip/symbol fault modes: 1 bit
fault + 1 bus fault, 1 bit fault + 1 row/bank/chip fault, 1 bit
fault + 1 pin fault, 1 pin fault + 1 pin fault, and chip+chip
fault. 3 fault mode is also included in our evaluation.
As shown in Figure 7 for each run, we generate a 64-
byte random data (representing a cache-line). The cache-line
is now encoded with the specific scheme and appropriate
errors are injected as per the fault mode. The corrupted
encoded cacheline is fed to the corresponding decoder
logic. As described earlier, Baseline, Extended-baseline and
SSCMSD use four codewords per each cache-line whereas
Bamboo, Extended-Bamboo use only one codeword. Ac-
cordingly, the baseline and Extended-baseline decoder logic
use four RS decoders. Bamboo and extended bamboo em-
ploy only one RS decoder in their decoder logic. For SS-
CMSD, we use the decoder logic described in Section 6.2
(Read Operation). The decoder-logic will then determine
whether this cache-line has Detectable Uncorrectable Er-
ror(s) (DUE) or Detectable Correctable Error(s) (DCE) or no
error(s). If the logic flagged any one of the codewords of the
cache-line to be a DUE, we do not suspect the decoder to be
wrong as our error model has multiple symbol errors (2, 3)
beyond the SSC-RS correction range. In this case, the entire
cacheline has to be a DUE as this cacheline cannot be con-
sumed and we report the whole cacheline to be a correctly
flagged (CF) by the decoder. For the remaining non-DUE
cachelines, we compare the original (non-corrupted) 64-byte
cacheline with the cumulative output of the decoder-logic.
If they do not match, we report it to be a Silent Data
Corruption (SDC). Otherwise we report that the scheme
(decoder) correctly flagged (CF) the cacheline.
We generate one billion runs for every iteration and exe-
cute each simulation (or experiment) for 10 iterations. Table
5 lists the mean % for these statistics across 10 iterations.
The standard deviation for each of the experiments (except
for SSCMSD) was up to 10,000 (for 1 billion cachelines).
As 1-bit, 1-pin, Row/Chip/Bank, Column, Bus faults
result in errors confined within 1 symbol, they are corrected
by all the schemes. Faults which lead to 2 or 3 symbol errors
in at least one of the codeword lead to SDCs rates ranging
from 0 to 7.6% in both Baseline and extended Baseline. 1-
bit + 1-pin fault and 1-pin + 1-pin fault modes result in two
symbol errors for Bamboo-ECC and extended Bamboo-ECC,
hence they are corrected by them. As extended Bamboo-
ECC can correct up-to six symbol errors it can provide 100%
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Comparison Baseline Bamboo-ECC Extended Baseline Extended Bamboo SSCMSD Stats
RS(18,16,8) (8 ECC symbols) RS-SSC(19,16,8) (12 ECC symbols) RS(19,17,8) &
32-bit hash
Storage Overhead 12.5% 12.5% 18.75% 18.75% 18.75%
ECC Symbols/CW 2 8 3 12 2
Upto 1-Chip/Bus Fault 100 100 100 100 100 CF
Correlated 2 11.4 0.9 12.3 0 SDC
Bus fault 98 88.6 99.1 87.7 100 CF
1 bit fault + 4 11.1 2 0 0 SDC
1 bus fault 96 88.9 98 100 100 CF
1 bit fault + 6 11 3.2 0 0 SDC
(row/bank/chip) 94 89 96.8 100 100 CF
1 bit fault + 7.6 0 3 0 0 SDC
1 pin fault 92.4 100 97 100 100 CF
1 pin fault + 3.5 0 1.6 0 0 SDC
1 pin fault 96.5 100 98.4 100 100 CF
Chip fault + < 0.1 11 < 0.1 12 0 SDC
Chip fault > 99.9 89 > 99.9 88 100 CF
3 fault mode < 0.1 11 < 0.1 12 0 SDC
> 99.9 89 > 99.9 88 100 CF
TABLE 5
Simulations results of SSC-RS, Bamboo-ECC and SSCMSD.
correction with 1-bit fault + (row/chip/bank) fault and 1-bit
+ 1-bus fault modes. On the other hand, SSCMSD is able to
avoid SDCs in all of the above fault modes. We also executed
these simulations for 10 iterations, with 10 billion runs per
iteration for SSCMSD scheme to understand the impact of
hash aliasing. We found that there were up to 5 SDCs for
each iteration across all the fault modes.
7.1 Experiments for Address Protection
We also executed the simulations described in Table 5 for
SSCMSD to include protection for address bits. Therefore,
instead of using a random 64 bytes cache-line for each
experiment (shown in Figure 7), we used random 72 bytes,
each time to include 8 bytes of random address along with
the cache-line. The results were identical to the ones shown
in Table 5 for SSCMSD. In addition, we executed simulations
to verify the effectiveness of SSCMSD in the presence of
address errors during READs. As noted in Section 6.3,
SSCMSD can provide protection against address errors dur-
ing READs. Our scheme prevents SDCs due to errors in
address bits during READs provided there was no address
corruption during a prior WRITE operation. If one writes
data to an unintended location due to address corruption,
there is no way to detect such errors unless address is also
stored along with data in DRAM. CAP[14] and eWRITECRC
[13] can take care of address corruption during WRITEs. So,
in these simulations, for each run, we generated random 72
bytes (representing the cache-line data and 8 byte address)
and computed the hash (HA) of this data, address pair.
Then, we used a 8-byte error mask to introduce random
errors in the address bits. Next, we computed the hash (HB)
of this data, corrupted address pair and compared HA and
HB. If they differed, we declare that our scheme detected the
errors (correctly flagged), otherwise we declare that there
was silent data corruption. We executed this simulation
for 10 iterations. Each iteration comprised of 100 billion
runs. Across these 10 iterations the mean of SDCs was 24.5
runs with a standard deviation of 4.3. The remaining were
correctly flagged (detected as errors) by our scheme.
8 CONCLUSION
We motivate the need for addressing multiple symbol errors
in CHIKPILL based DRAM subsystems given the trend of
increase in failures in these systems. Based on the nature
of these failures, we analyzed possible errors and then de-
veloped a new error-handling scheme called Single Symbol
Correction, Multi Symbol Detection (SSCMSD).
We implemented SSCMSD using CRC-32 and Single
symbol correcting reed solomon (SSC-RS) code. By leverag-
ing the usage of systematic SSC-RS code and simple CRC-32
hash, our novel design’s impact on the READ latency is very
negligible. Our simulations compare SSCMSD scheme with
baseline (SSC-RS) and Bamboo-ECC. The results clearly
demonstrate that SSCMSD is effective in avoiding Silent
Data Corruptions (SDCs) in the presence of multiple symbol
errors.
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